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ABSTRACT
This article investigates the extent to which the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and Don-
ald Davidson’s semantic holism (DSH) harmonize. We first characterize CSR, philosophical 
semantics (and more specifically DSH). We then note a prima facie tension between CSR 
and DSH’s view of First-Person Authority (that we know what is meant when we speak in a 
way that we do not when others speak). If CSR is correct that the causes of religious belief 
are located in cognitive processes in the mind/brain, then religious insiders might have no 
idea what they are talking about: only the scholar of CSR would have a chance of knowing 
what they ‘really’ mean. The article argues that the resolution to this problem is to take 
seriously DSH’s rejection of semantic bifurcation, specifically rejecting the idea that reli-
gious and non-religious language can be sharply distinguished. We conclude by supporting 
the following claims: (i) common cognitive neural/psychological processes are explanatorily 
relevant in proposed meaning-theories for any discourse, and (ii) those processes need 
semantic supplementation with reference to external and naturalistic factors (biological, 
cultural, environmental etc.).
Keywords: cognitive science of religion, cognitive theory, holism, semantics, philosophy of 
language, religious studies, theory of religion.
RESUMO
Este artigo investiga o quanto a ciência cognitiva da religião (CCR) e o holismo semântico 
de Donald Davidson (HSD) se harmonizam. Primeiro caracterizamos a CCR, a semântica 
filosófica (e mais especificamente o HSD). Notamos, então, uma tensão prima facie entre 
a CCR e a visão do HSD sobre a Autoridade da Primeira Pessoa (que sabemos o que sig-
nifica quando falamos de uma forma que não fazemos quando os outros falam). Se a CCR 
estiver correta em afirmar que as causas da crença religiosa estão localizadas nos processos 
cognitivos da mente/cérebro, então os membros de dentro da religião podem não ter ideia 
do que estão falando: somente o acadêmico da CCR teria a chance de saber o que eles 
realmente querem dizer. O artigo argumenta que a resolução para este problema é levar a 
sério a rejeição do HSD à bifurcação semântica, rejeitando especificamente a ideia de que 
as linguagens religiosa e não-religiosa podem ser nitidamente distinguidas. Concluímos 
com as seguintes afirmações: (i) processos neurais/psicológicos cognitivos comuns são ex-
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The aim of this paper is to explore some of the con-
nections between one particular influential position in phil-
osophical semantics – Donald Davidson’s semantic holism 
– and a relatively sub-area of the study of religion/s, the cog-
nitive science/study of religion (CSR). Our main interests are 
to understand the extent to which these two positions har-
monize and where they stand in tension.
By “the study of religion/s” we mean the academic and 
empirically grounded study of  ecific religions along with 
theoretical and meta-theoretical discussions related to the na-
ture and scope of the category ‘religion.’4 Like the study of cul-
ture more generally, this discipline’s central object of study is 
accessible only through theoretical reflection. In other words, 
scholars of religion/s must begin with some sort of theoretical 
stance on the nature of religion in general, and thus the study 
of religion/s goes hand in hand with theorizing religion. The-
orizing is language dependent, and one of our central theses – 
though not argued for here – is that theorizing is constrained 
by how language works. In other words, basic commitments 
in the philosophy of language impact how one can think or 
theorize about something. To the extent that CSR can be 
thought of as one of the more recent and promising theories 
of religion, or at least a theoretical approach to studying reli-
gion, the philosophy of language is relevant to it.
Our research question is “to what extent do CSR and 
DSH harmonize?” The details of our metatheoretical stance 
on the relation of philosophy of language to social science 
in general, and to the study of religion in particular, will be 
left largely undeveloped here (for further details see Engler 
and Gardiner, 2010, 2013, 2015, 2017b; Gardiner and En-
gler, 2010, 2012). We consider the relationship from only a 
single per ective in the philosophy of language, namely that 
of Donald Davidson.5 His overall theory of language, which 
we will call Davidsonian Semantic Holism (DSH), is well 
known in philosophy, though less so in the study of religion/s. 
However, an important set of relatively recent works have 
emerged which examine the significance of philosophical se-
mantics in general, and of Donald Davidson in particular, for 
theory of religion.6 Davidson’s position is complex, e ecially 
in its details, and we will explain its relevant key features as 
we go along, ignoring many others that are less central.
Background
Cognitive science/Study of religion
In order to consider the interplay between DSH and 
CSR, we need to chara erize both. We begin here with the 
latter. Proponents of CSR tend to emphasize its status as an 
emerging and multi-disciplinary research programme rather 
than as a well-defined or articulated theory. However, the 
task of raising incisive semantic questions requires that we en-
gage a fairly concrete position. This section of the paper offers 
an ideal-typical account of CSR, concentrating e ecially on 
those elements which impinge on DSH.7 
In general terms, CSR posits that (i) religious beliefs, 
and so behaviors, are (ii) caused, constrained, made possible 
or, in some other sense, chara erized by (iii) normal, innate, 
domain- ecific, mental or psychological structures, mod-
ules, tools, inference systems, or representation systems: e.g., 
“Religion ensues from the ordinary workings of the human 
mind…” (Atran, 2002, p. ix); “the adult human brain possesses 
an array of  ecialized tools … [and] these tools are factors 
that might help account for cross-cultural or recurrent fea-
tures of human thought and behavior, such a beliefs in gods 
and God” (Barrett, 2004, p. 3, 5); On the one hand, CSR holds 
that religion is constrained by innate factors in the same way 
as other domains of human thought and a ion; as a result, 
the explanatory principles that underlie this approach to the 
study of religion are common to all (normal adult) humans 
and, hence, are applicable to other a ects of culture: e.g., “the 
mental representation of God and of buddhas are made pos-
sible by the same mental mechanisms that are used in repre-
senting ourselves and our fellow human beings as embodied 
agents” (Pyysiäinen, 2009, p. vii); “members of the cognitivist 
school are concerned with showing that innate and therefore 
universal features of cognitive organization are responsible 
plicitamente relevantes em teorias de significado propostas para qualquer discurso, e (ii) 
esses processos precisam de suplementação semântica com referência a fatores externos e 
naturalistas (biológicos, culturais, ambientais, etc.).
Palavras-chave: ciência cognitiva da religião, teoria cognitiva, holismo, semântica, filosofia 
da linguagem, ciências da religião, teoria da religião.
4 On the status of the study of religion/s as a discipline, see Engler and Stausberg (2011).
5 Davidson is one of the most important and influential philosophers of the 20th Century, at least in the Anglo-American tradition. He 
published seminal work in action theory, epistemology, metaphysics, decision theory and philosophy of language in important collec-
tions of essays: e.g., Davidson (1982, 1984a, 2001a, 2005).
6 For a representative sample, see the following: Godlove (1989, 2014); Lawson and McCauley (1990); Penner (1994, 1999); Frankenber-
ry and Penner (1999); Frankenberry (2002); Schilbrack (2014); Davis (2012); Jensen (2003, 2004, 2014); Gardiner and Engler (2010, 2012); 
Engler and Gardiner (2010, 2012, 2013, 2017b); Bush (2014).
7 See Engler and Gardiner (2017a) for a discussion of some of the main critical responses that have been made to CSR.
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for the attractor positions around which patterns of cultur-
al innovation tend to congregate” (Whitehouse, 2004, p. 21). 
On the other hand, CSR offers varying accounts of the distinc-
tive nature of religious thinking: e.g., “religious concepts invari-
ably include information that is counter-intuitive…” (Boyer, 2001, 
p. 65, original emphasis); “the cognitive basis for religion is a 
generalisation and systematization of an innate human ten-
dency towards anthropomorphic models for representing our 
environment” (see Guthrie, 1993; Martin, 2003, p. 221).
Arriving at a more  ecific chara erization of CSR in-
volves searching for a common core behind the diverse ap-
proaches associated with this sub-field of the study of religion. 
Scholars in the area claim several distinct names for their 
field: “cognitive science of religion” (Lawson, 2000; Pyysiäin-
en, 2001; Barrett, 2007a); “cognitive theory of religion” (Boyer, 
1994; Anttonen, 2000; Whitehouse, 2004); “cognitive study 
of religion” (Kamppinen, 2001); “cognitive approaches to re-
ligion” (Boyer, 1990; Geertz, 2004), “cognitive per ectives 
on religion” (Whitehouse, 1998; Andresen, 2001), or “cog-
nitive foundations of religion” (Whitehouse and McCauley, 
2005). As this range of descriptions suggests, there is no broad 
consensus regarding the status, or the theoretical presupposi-
tions, of CSR. This holds even within the narrower ‘scientific’ 
conception of the sub-field: “‘Cognitive science of religion’ is 
now an e ablished term but the field it is meant to cover is 
by no means homogeneous” (Pyysiäinen, 2008, p. 101). The 
remainder of this section chara erizes CSR in terms of a 
minimal core of its claims and concomitants.
CSR is primarily concerned with two  ecific a ects of 
religion: the representation and transmission of religious con-
cepts: e.g., “the spread of spirit phenomena is in part explained 
by universal micromechanisms of cognition that generate 
predispositions and tendencies toward certain patterns of 
thinking and behavior” (Cohen, 2007, p. 181); “the cognitive 
science of religion […] [is] a field that emerged in the 1990s as 
an attempt to explain how the structure of religious rituals is 
mentally represented and how religious concepts are cultur-
ally transmitted” (Pyysiäinen, 2008, p. 101).
CSR is centrally concerned with explaining the causes of 
religious belief: “A theory of religion must include a theory of 
religious belief, and a theory of belief must address the source 
of belief [...]” (Guthrie, 1993, p. 31). CSR tends to use a vari-
ety of terms to explain the relation between basic cognitive 
structures or processes and religious beliefs: ‘constrain,’ ‘influ-
ence,’ ‘generate,’ etc. On the one hand, this raises the possibil-
ity that at least some work in CSR is not concerned with the 
basic causal factors of beliefs but rather with the way in which 
beliefs, whatever their cause, are shaped, channeled, altered 
or selected for under certain conditions. On the other hand, 
no work we are aware of clearly and explicitly makes such 
claims, over against a causal account, and such an alterna-
tive non-causal approach would still face important seman-
tic questions. For the purpose of this paper, we investigate an 
account that looks to cognitive factors as standing in a causal 
relation to religious belief. At the very least, this explores the 
semantic status of at least an important approach within a 
broader conception of CSR.
Thus, for clarity’s sake, we will attribute the following 
two main elements to CSR and treat it as if it were a homo-
geneous theory:
(1)  Religious beliefs are an important item of investiga-
tion for the study of religion/s.
(2)  The formulation and transmission of religious beliefs 
are to be explained as the causal result of (near) uni-
versal and innate cognitive/psychological processes 
in the human mind/brain. 
In terms of the role of religious belief for the study of 
religion/s, we follow Godlove (2002) in identifying two main 
and antagonistic streams: (i) those that hold that “belief ” is an 
explanatorily important category, and (ii) those that hold it is 
of no explanatory interest or importance whatsoever. We’ll 
dub the first position “pro-belief ” and the second “anti-belief.” 
Thus, one of the central tenets we assign to CSR is the central-
ity of the category of (religious) belief.8 A third common ten-
et, though not one central to our discussion, has been the idea 
that there is a definitive element to religious belief involving 
purported allusion, at some level, to “supernatural agents.”9
Philosophical semantics
This section offers an overview of theories of meaning, 
followed by a closer look at DSH. The study of religion, and 
more surprisingly theories of religion, seldom pay explicit 
attention to issues of semantics, though there are important 
exceptions (see footnote 6). Our choice to place CSR in dia-
logue with semantic theory is not an idle one: no theory of 
religion can get off the ground without at least an implicit 
theory of meaning.
We use the expression “theory of meaning” to refer to a 
broad philosophical theory about the nature of the meaning 
of particular bits of language, principally sentences. We take 
it for granted that languages are, by and large, human arti-
facts whose core use is as a vehicle for communication and 
expression of propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.), 
or of thought more generally. As such, much of philosophi-
cal semantics involves elements of the philosophy of mind, 
8 We recognize that this will be problematic. Davis (2007) for example castigates CSR as a “degenerate research programme” in part 
because he views it as eliminitivist of belief. However, as tenet (2) asserts, CSR has been actively engaged in seeking to explain the 
origins, function, and transmission of religious beliefs, including ritual. We will further argue this point later in the paper.
9 There is some variety in how this is to be understood, ranging from “superhuman agency” (Lawson and McCauley, 1990), to “anthro-
pomorphism” (Guthrie, 1993), to “counterintuitive supernatural agents” (Atran and Norenzayan, 2004), amongst others.
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of which cognitive psychology has been of particular interest 
and importance. We point scholars to Jeppe Sinding Jensen’s 
excellent article, “Meaning and Religion: On Semantics in the 
Study of Religion” (2004) for an overview of the positions and 
history of semantic theory with  ecial emphasis on the study 
of religion. Following his lead, we reserve the term “meaning” 
to the semantic contents of sentences – to what is said by an 
utterance, what thought is conveyed by a claim, what a listen-
er would need to understand in order to grasp what was said, 
what particular assertions are about, etc.10
Although the history of semantics is long and varied, 
and there are many distinct axes in the topology of possible 
theories, in this article we will concentrate on a triad along 
just one of them:
•  Semantic Internalism: The meaning of a sentence is sole-
ly determined by the intentions of the  eaker – the 
sentence means whatever she intends it to mean, re-
gardless of whether others are in a position to under-
stand it. Meanings are “in the head.”
•  Semantic Externalism: The meaning of a sentence is 
solely determined by an objective relation between the 
sentence and mind-independent entities. The  eaker 
need not have any beliefs about or knowledge of the 
meaning of her own utterances. Meanings “just ain’t in 
the head”11 and so have a public and empirically acces-
sible dimension.12
•  Mixed Semantic Theories: The meaning of a sentence is 
given by the intentions of a  eaker to report her be-
liefs, where her beliefs are causally related, in part, to 
external factors. The  eaker is in a privileged position 
via-à-vis knowledge of the meaning of her own utter-
ances, but it must be possible, in pra ice, for others to 
correctly interpret her sentences.
Theorists of religion can ignore but not avoid taking a 
stance regarding these semantic options, even if implicit. The 
adoption or primacy of a semantic theory will have substantial 
methodological implications for the study of religion. Internal-
ism, for example, suggests that the means to understanding a 
particular religion is to determine the intentional content as 
far as the believer is concerned. The phonetic vocalizations 
might perhaps be taken as a synta ic “code” which, if cracked, 
would allow the researcher access to the normally private and 
hidden mental states of the believer. Phenomenological analy-
sis springs to mind here. Externalism, on the other hand, would 
regard the vocalizations of participants as largely irrelevant – 
the researcher should concentrate on publicly observable fac-
tors, such as the social function of the discourse/ritual. Func-
tionalist or structuralist analyses would seem plausible here. 
There is a natural affinity between these semantic the-
ories and the two attitudes, noted above, about the status of 
belief as a basic category in the study of religion. Pro-belief 
theorists of religion should favour either internalism or mixed 
theories. Those who are anti-belief should be inclined to-
wards externalist views. Again, we assert that the issue cannot 
be avoided: theories of religion are not semantically neutral. 
The rational defensibility of a theory in one discipline rests, 
in part, on how well it harmonizes with or finds support from 
well-supported theories from other disciplines. Arguably, se-
mantic theories are among the most fundamental of theories 
that should be reckoned with. If, for example, semantic exter-
nalism were shown to have significant problems, this would 
have a significant, and negative impact, on theories of religion 
that discounted the concept of ‘belief,’ if these naturally har-
monize in the way we have sugge ed. In other words, deny-
ing the importance of ‘belief ’ in the study of religion does not 
side ep the need to make sense of meaning.
The take-home point of this topography is that DSH is 
a mixed semantic theory (details to be filled in a bit more in 
the next section) that is pro-belief in orientation. We can thus 
refine our research question: to what extent does CSR har-
monize with mixed semantic theories and with a pro-belief 
orientation? 
We move on now to a closer look at DSH. In contrast to 
the term “theory of meaning,” Davidson (1990) uses “mean-
ing-theory” as a proposed theory for a given language L which 
generates meaning- ecifying theorems for any given sen-
tence of the form:
‘s’ means p
The first component of Davidson’s project argues that 
Tarski’s (1944) “semantic” definition of truth (in terms of ‘sat-
isfa ion’), which generates “T-sentences” of the form:
‘s’ is true iff p
provides all the formal and structural elements for a 
meaning-theory. In other words, Davidson argued that a Tar-
10 A distinction is often drawn between “semantics” and “pragmatics,” or between what a sentence means and how it may be used. 
There is considerable debate in the philosophy of language whether this distinction can be sustained (e.g., the essays in Ezcurdia and 
Stainton, 2013) and whether particular uses of language, especially assertion, can be selected as paradigmatic. For simplicity, in this 
article we incline towards the view that assertion is the primary use of language, and hence that semantic content is by-and-large ex-
pressible in truth-evaluable form.
11 The externalist slogan “Meanings just ain’t in the head” comes from Putnam (1975, p. 227) who, together with Kripke (1980), did 
pioneering work in developing an externalist position that has come to be called the Causal Theory of Reference. That work involved 
construction of some of the most compelling arguments against semantic internalism.
12 DeCaro (1999) distinguishes between various types of externalism, suggesting that Davidson falls into the category of “triangular 
externalism” in which semantic content is fixed by a triple relation between an individual, a linguistic community, and the external world. 
For reasons that should become clear, we consider Davidson to be neither internalist nor fully externalist.
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skian truth-theory is a meaning-theory. Hence, Davidson en-
dorses a truth-conditional theory of meaning.13
With re ect to CSR, there are a number of vital ele-
ments of Davidson’s thought needing highlight:
(1)  On pain of the semantic paradoxes, the “s” and the 
“p” in the T-sentence must be in different languages. 
The T-sentences, then, purport to provide transla-
tions; translatability, or, for a more familiar David-
sonian term, interpretability, is a precondition for 
the very possibility of meaning (see LePore and Mc-
Laughlin, 1985).
(2)  A meaning-theory is formally adequate to the extent 
that it delivers T-sentences as theorems, but is ma-
terially adequate iff it delivers the correct T-sentences 
(i.e., expresses genuine synonymies between “s” and 
“p”). Davidson views each formally adequate mean-
ing-theory as a proposal that must then be empiri-
cally te ed for material adequacy.
(3)  Interpretation involves a relation between what we 
will call  eakers and interpreters. An interpreter is 
implicitly attempting to construct a correct mean-
ing-theory with re ect to some  eaker (or com-
munity of  eakers). Davidson’s strategy requires 
the primacy of what he calls “radical interpretation,” 
where the  eaker and interpreter are not presumed 
to share a language (e.g., Davidson, 1984c [1973], 
1974, 1984d [1974], 1980, 2001b [1983]).
(4)  Speakers do not interpret their own utterances. 
Rather, we presume that they have “First-Person 
Authority” with re ect to their own claims. By this, 
Davidson does not hold a Cartesian thesis about 
incorrigibility or that meaning is somehow private. 
What he means is that we know what is meant 
when we  eak in a way that we do not when others 
 eak. Specifically, we must “interpret” the utteranc-
es of others, but not our own, by implicit reference 
to a constructible meaning-theory.14
(5)  Not only is language the vehicle through which 
thought is expressed, meaning is correlative with be-
lief: “We do not know what someone means unless 
we know what he believes; we do not know what 
someone believes unless we know what he means” 
(Davidson, 1984b [1967], p. 27). Interpretability 
requires breaking into this “meaning-belief ” circle. 
Davidson’s proposal involves two assumptions: (i) 
First-Person Authority, and (ii) the Principle of 
Charity.15 The first assumption allows the inter-
preter to break into the ‘meaning-belief circle’ in her 
own case, and the second assumption allows her to 
bootstrap to the third-person case. In a proposed 
T-sentence “‘s’ is true iff p,” the interpreter assumes 
knowledge of the meaning of ‘p’ (= First-Person Au-
thority), correlates her believing ‘p’ with a set of ac-
cessible causal conditions, presumes that the  eaker 
will also correlate his beliefs with the same causal 
conditions (= Principle of Charity), and hence have 
a basis for translating the  eaker’s ‘s’ with her own ‘p.’ 
Thus, the causal conditions must be equally accessi-
ble by  eaker and interpreter.
(6)  Davidson identifies the semantic content of utter-
ances in two distinct ways. The most well-known is 
the identification with truth-conditions:
[To] give the truth conditions is a way of giv-
ing the meaning of a sentence. To know the 
semantic concept of truth for a language is 
to know what it is for a sentence – any sen-
tence – to be true, and this amounts, in one 
good sense we can give to the phrase, to 
understand the language (Davidson, 1984b 
[1967], p. 24).
The second is with the causes of belief: “Words and 
thoughts are, in the most basic cases, necessarily about the 
sorts of objects and events that commonly cause them […] 
Our simplest sentences are given their meanings by the sit-
uations that generally cause us to hold them as true or false” 
(Davidson, 2001e [1988], p. 45).
This second point is crucial for assessing CSR: a David-
sonian account of the meaning of religious beliefs will be in-
separable from an account of the causes of those beliefs.
Davidson tends to modify these claims with “in the 
simplest and most basic cases” type of clauses, suggesting that 
an account of the meaning of more complex or higher-level 
sentences might be given differently. Although this is a mat-
ter of some controversy, we note three possible views: (i) the 
identification of semantic content with the observable causes 
of belief holds for all language, including “less basic” cases16; 
(ii) although the semantic contents of “less basic” beliefs are 
13 Although Davidson regards truth-conditions as the core concept in an account of meaning, he denies that truth has any robust or 
metaphysically-loaded content, as for example that offered by a correspondence theory of truth. See Davidson (1990, 1996) and Gar-
diner and Engler (2010).
14 See for example Davidson (2001c [1984], 1986, 2001d [1987], 2001e [1988]). Godlove points out that first person authority with 
respect to religious discourse is often questioned by scholars of religion, and his analysis of why it is less secure in such contexts as 
opposed to more concrete discourse plays an important role in his discussion of the nature and use of “frameworks” within theories of 
religion (Godlove, 1989). We will return to this point later.
15 The Principle of Charity involves the presumption an interpreter must make that speakers are as rational as she is. See for example 
Davidson (1984c [1973], 1984d [1974], 2001b [1983], 1986, 1994, 1999).
16 There are some passages in which this seems to be Davidson’s position. See, for example, Davidson (2001e [1988], p. 51; 1984b 
[1967], p. 31).
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separate from their relevant observable causes, nonetheless 
they must be “traced back” to that of the “basic cases”; and (iii) 
the semantic constraints on “less basic” beliefs are substantial-
ly different from those on the “basic cases.” We will return to 
this point later.
However, with re ect to at least the “basic cases,” Da-
vidson sees the “truth-conditional” identification of semantic 
content as equivalent to the causal one: 
[We] are justified in asserting a sentence 
in the required sense only if we believe the 
sentence we use to make the assertion is 
true; and what ultimately ties language to 
the world is that the conditions which typ-
ically cause us to hold sentences true con-
stitute the truth-conditions, and hence the 
meanings, of our sentence (Davidson, 1996, 
p. 275, original emphasis).
The core issue: The threat to 
First-Person Authority
This raises the final refinement of our research question: 
to what extent do the tri-identifications of truth-conditions 
= causes of beliefs = semantic content harmonize with CSR? 
In our view, there is a prima facie incompatibility between (i) 
CSR, (ii) Davidson’s account of semantic content, and (iii) the 
presumption of First-Person Authority. As (ii) and (iii) seem 
to be central to Davidson’s project, there is a prima facie in-
compatibility between CSR and DSH. The task in this section 
is to explain that prima facie tension, explore its resolution, 
and point at some broad conclusions for the study of religion.
The tension
There appear to be counter-examples to Davidson’s 
tri-identifications. For example, the truth-conditions of my 
utterance “The sun is shining” presumably involve a shining 
sun, but imagine that I come to believe that as a result of a noc-
turnal hypnotism. In this case, the cause of my belief and its 
truth-conditions appear to diverge, and we are left in a quan-
dary as to the semantic content of my utterance. We seem to 
be initially faced with a dilemma: either (i) the content of my 
utterance is given by its cause rather than its truth-conditions, 
in which case (as I have no beliefs about the cause) I fail to 
understand the content of my own utterance (i.e., First-Person 
Authority is lost), or (ii) the content is given by the truth-con-
ditions, in which case the causal antecedents are semantically 
impotent (i.e., radical interpretation is imperiled). Both horns 
are equally problematic to Davidson’s project.
To be sure, in the example it seems promising to deny 
that one actually does believe what is sugge ed in the hypnot-
ic trance. However, CSR appears to provide more compelling 
counter-examples. One of its basic tenets is that the causes of 
religious belief are to be located in cognitive processes in the 
mind/brain. Therefore, under the “cause = semantic content” 
identification, an expression of religious belief, say “God bless-
es this marriage,” is to be interpreted as being about those cog-
nitive processes; i.e., a correct meaning-theory should be con-
structible in which the translation would be in the language of 
cognitive psychology or neuroscience. But, surely the  eaker 
would, if able to understand the proposed translation, reject 
it as a translation. She would be much more likely to regard 
her statement as being about God, marriages, and benedic-
tions. In other words, CSR + “cause = content” is incompati-
ble with the presumption of First-Person Authority.17 Indeed, 
the failure of First-Person Authority would be systemic and 
wholesale; insiders would have no idea what they are talking 
about; only the scholar of CSR would have a chance of know-
ing what they ‘really’ mean. As Davidson puts the point:
[If] the correct determination of an agent’s 
thoughts depends, at least to some degree, 
on the causal history of those thoughts, and 
the agent may be ignorant of that history, 
then the agent may not know what he thinks 
(and, mutatis mutandis, what he means, in-
tends, etc.). The new antisubjectivism [i.e., 
the rejection of semantic internalism] is thus 
seen as a threat to first person authority – to 
the fact that people generally know without 
recourse to inference from evidence, and 
so in a way that others do not, what they 
themselves think, want, and intend (David-
son, 2001e [1988], p. 48).18
We will deal with the difficulties of this view – e ecially 
for CSR – shortly.
On the other hand, consider the “truth-conditions = se-
mantic content” identification. Here we must make a tricky 
distinction between truth-conditions as they are “in reality” 
and as they are conceived by some  eaker. Consider an ex-
ample invoking logical behaviourism: what are the truth-con-
ditions for the sentence “Jones is in pain”? We cannot, without 
vacuity, merely say that they are that Jones be in pain, for there 
are at least two rival theories about what that amounts to: his 
17 There is a logically possible – though courageous – resolution of the tension. One could argue that the cognitive processes are merely 
intermediary causes, where even they themselves are to be explained by reference to God – i.e., that God ordained it such that we 
developed the cognitive processes which brought about religious beliefs. In that way, the speaker’s opinion that her utterance is about 
God is correct – it is, as God is the (ultimate) cause of her belief. Thus, a transcendental argument for the existence of God emerges: 
God’s existence is a necessary precondition for the consistency of CSR and semantic holism. We won’t even begin to discuss what is 
wrong with this argument…
18 Although Davidson thinks that this involves a “misunderstanding,” his argument is not compelling in the case of religious discourse.
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undergoing a certain phenomenal experience and his being 
disposed to manifest pain behaviour. The logical behaviourist 
could regard the first as the truth-conditions that are normal-
ly supposed by the naïve, whereas the second are the “real” 
truth-conditions. So, which are the truth-conditions supplied 
on the right-hand side of its “correct” T-sentence? Analogous-
ly, which of the pra itioner’s or CSR’s assigned truth-condi-
tions provides the semantic content to “God blesses this mar-
riage”; is it about God, marriages, and benedictions or about 
cognitive processes? Either (i) the “subjective” assignment of 
truth-conditions semantically trumps the “actual” truth-con-
ditions; or (ii) the reverse holds.
By rejecting all “substantive” accounts of truth (e.g., cor-
respondence and coherence), Davidson rejects the grounds 
for drawing the distinction. However, it can be recast in this 
form: which of the truth-conditions as posited by the naïve 
or the learned supply the semantic content? This display re-
veals the confusion: a meaning-theory is an attempt to trans-
late from the  eaker’s language to the interpreter’s, and so 
it is the truth-conditions as intended by the  eaker which 
have primacy. If the interpreter supplies truth-conditions not 
intended by the  eaker, she simply fails to translate. David-
son chara erizes “meaning” as “a definite cognitive content 
that its author wishes to convey and that the interpreter 
must grasp if he is to get the message” (1984e [1978], p. 262). 
He reinforces this in a later article: “A malapropism or slip of 
the tongue, if it means anything, means what its promulgator 
intends it to mean. [...] An utterance has certain truth-condi-
tions only if the  eaker intends it to be interpreted as having 
those truth-conditions” (Davidson, 1990, p. 310). And most 
recently: “If we want to understand a particular  eaker, we 
must somehow know or find out or intuit what that particu-
lar  eaker takes to be the truth conditions of his or her utter-
ance” (Davidson, 1999, p. 33). Of course, determining which 
truth-conditions a  eaker assigns to their utterances just is to 
interpret their  eech.
So, where does this leave CSR with re ect to the 
“truth-conditions = semantic content” identification? In the 
first place, it seems we must reject the idea that CSR gives us 
insight into the truth-conditions of religious claims. Period. 
Some might be tempted to add the clause “as they are under-
stood by religious pra itioners,” but we have just argued that 
this clause adds nothing. We imagine that some, like Barrett 
(2007b), will not find this problematic, but su ect that at 
least some will find this result sobering. In the second place, 
divorcing truth-conditions from CSR-understood causes 
leaves the key theses of CSR of virtually no semantic explan-
atory value. This would certainly reduce the aspirations of 
CSR to give a theory of or to explain religious belief, as beliefs 
are fundamentally semantic entities.
Where does this leave the apparent tension between 
the twin identifications of “truth-conditions” = “semantic 
content” and “causes of belief ” = “semantic content? On the 
one hand, it is tempting to conclude that, as DSH requires 
that the identifications be equivalent, and CSR shows that 
they aren’t, so much the worse for DSH. Alternatively, as CSR 
challenges only the latter identification, a closer look at that 
is warranted. Recall that the primary tension is that, in the 
case of religious language, CSR coupled with the identifica-
tion jeopardizes the presumption of First-Person Authority. 
That is, by offering a reductionist account of the causes of re-
ligious belief, CSR undermines insider’s claim to know what 
they mean when they use religious language.
CSR and the Centrality of Belief
The challenge to First-Person Authority threatens CSR 
for methodological reasons. Much of the research in CSR has 
involved these steps: (i) identify a class of religious beliefs in 
some linguistic community, and (ii) through social scientific 
statistical analysis and empirically te able hypotheses, cor-
relate those beliefs with certain universal psychological pro-
cesses. The psychological processes in (ii) then serve to ex-
plain a number of features of the beliefs in (i), in particular 
of the function, transmissibility and utility of religious belief. 
As such CSR could be taken as a theory of religion – i.e., as an 
explanation of religious belief.
The methodological curiosity involves the first step – 
the identification of a class of religious beliefs in a linguistic 
community. Difficulties in being able to so identify beliefs 
would be difficulties in employing the methodological appa-
ratus of CSR.
How can a researcher identify a class of religious be-
liefs? One possibility is to have  eakers self-classify their 
beliefs as religious/non-religious. However, this suggestion 
implausibly requires that  eakers clearly distinguish be-
tween their religious and non-religious beliefs, and that the 
category of the “religious” is understood uniformly between 
 eaker and interpreter. Most seriously, though, it assumes 
that  eakers have First-Person Authority with re ect 
to their religious beliefs, which CSR challenges. Another 
possibility is to equip the interpreter with some pre-e ab-
lished criteria – such as implicit reference to counterin-
tuitive supernatural agents – and have her classify the be-
liefs of  eakers. But, on what basis can a set of criteria be 
pre-e ablished? This seems to require a theory of religion 
as a pre-condition for CSR-inspired research, and hence it 
would be difficult to see CSR itself as offering a theory of 
religion. This would also be problematic in assuming that 
the interpreter can understand the utterances of the  eaker 
(at least, enough to classify them) outside of the conditions 
of radical interpretation.
A third possibility is sugge ed by Godlove’s “transcen-
dental placing of religious belief ” (1989, p. 122). In the case 
of recognizing a sentence as religious, Godlove presents an 
argument similar to Davidson’s, that to recognize a vocaliza-
tion as a sentence requires the presupposition of a number of 
factors. Godlove accepts one over-arching formal condition: 
that the sentence be “theoretical” as opposed to “observation-
al” (meaning, primarily, it resists correlation with changes in 
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the observable environment – i.e., resistance to radical in-
terpretation), and interestingly denies that there can be any 
“material” constraints, such as those proposed by CSR (e.g., 
“extrahuman generality” [1989, p. 142]): “Any strategy that 
tries to set material restrictions on the possible scope of reli-
gious belief must, I think, fail; we can expect at most formal 
constraints” (1989, p. 145). As resistance to radical interpre-
tation is his primary formal constraint on religiosity, he recog-
nizes that he needs a mechanism for being able to distinguish 
between meaningless noise and meaningful expression of re-
ligious belief. He proposes the Davidsonian notion that “the 
basic cases” will be the majority, and success in interpretation 
of them would vindicate the ascription of rationality to the 
 eaker (i.e., move Charity from an initial presumption to 
get interpretation off the ground to an empirically grounded 
formative principle) (1989, p. 156-157); i.e., difficult-to-in-
terpret vocalizations are more likely to be meaningful than 
empty noise. In those cases, the presumption of First-Person 
Authority is indeed jeopardized: 
If […] religious discourse is typically high-
ly theoretical […] we will, on that account, 
be pushed towards a naturalistic interpre-
tative strategy. That is, we will be pushed 
towards an interpretative strategy that frees 
the meaning of an utterance in ignorance of 
what the speaker may take to determine its 
meaning. And so we may find it necessary 
to interpret an utterance by connecting it 
with an event (a cause) of which the speaker 
seems unaware (Godlove, 1989, p. 155).
Godlove is essentially proposing a semantic bifurcation. 
In the observational “basic cases” truth-conditions (as posited 
by believers) and causes coincide, and a Davidsonian seman-
tics is unproblematic. In theoretical “religious” cases, though, 
truth-conditions (as posited by believers”) diverge, and their 
semantic content is given by their (unknown-to-the- eaker) 
causes. Failure of First-Person Authority is simply a causality 
of this consequence. Methodologically, the interpreter should 
adopt the latter interpretative strategy at the point where the 
former fails (Godlove, 1989, p. 157).
As interesting and rich as Godlove’s proposal is, it faces 
difficulties. In the first place, it is difficult to see how, on his 
account of religious language, interpretation involves transla-
tion from one language to another, the lynch pin of the for-
mal apparatus of theories of meaning according to Davidson’s 
project. Secondly, it eschews a role for  eaker intentionali-
ty, reducing the semantics of religious discourse to a purely 
“externalist” form. Finally, it faces a problem common to all 
forms of “bifurcated” theories of meaning – how to inter-
pret language which crosses  ecialized discourses. “Yahweh 
appeared as a burning bush” involves a challenging blend of 
“religious” and “observational” language (Engler and Gardiner, 
2010, p. 289).19
In any event, we are still left with the problem: how 
can we distinguish religious from non-religious belief, as CSR 
methodologically requires us to do, and do so (i) in a manner 
consistent with DSH, and (ii) prior to exploring the origin, 
function, transmission, etc. of those beliefs? 
A final response and 
concluding remarks
A fourth possibility is to eschew any semantic distinc-
tion between religious and non-religious discourse. In such a 
case, there is no question of the methodological need to iden-
tify a range of “religious” beliefs for which CSR would seek 
explanatory causes in terms of cognitive psychological pro-
cesses. Either such processes would be semantically neutral 
with re ect to all forms of discourse, or else would be equally 
potent with re ect to all. Religious language would be “as 
public as marriage and as observable as agriculture” (Geertz, 
1973, p. 91). Jensen expresses the point nicely:
The question seems to be whether there re-
ally is any such specific entity as ‘religious 
language’ and/or whether the semantics of 
religious systems are just ‘plain’ semantics 
of an order similar to other specialized ter-
minological systems, those of, say, politics, 
sports or economics (2004, p. 220).
Jensen clearly opts for unity of discourse: “[It] makes no 
sense to say that religious language has its own  ecial truth 
conditions not commensurate with or translatable into other 
forms of language. Religious language is an a ect- ecific ex-
tension of ordinary language” (1999, p. 421). 
We end with some brief reflections about the pro ects 
of this possibility, e ecially with regard to CSR.
In our view, Davidson’s programme is antithetical to bi-
furcated theories of meaning: meaning is meaning; and the 
conditions of radical interpretation, if they have any force, 
supply the basic constraints on the interpretation of any dis-
course. Hence, Davidsonians should find this proposal prom-
ising. To be sure, though, it continues to face the problem of 
applying those conditions beyond “the basic cases.”
Perhaps the problem, however, is in giving a rather nar-
row reading to the causes of religious belief, or of viewing CSR 
as overly reductionistic. By widening the lens, perhaps a num-
ber of issues can be made clearer and problems dissolved.
19 This problem is analogous to that first explored in connection with ethical discourse; early emotivists had argued that ethical discourse 
is purely expressive of emotions and hence have no truth-value. The Frege-Geach problem involves embedding such sentences in larger 
contexts which seem to be truth-evaluable, such as “If it is wrong to steal, then it is wrong to get little brother to steal.” The consequent 
seems to be entailed by the antecedent, but entailment is a relation between truth-valued claims (Geach, 1965).
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Davidson insists on the public or observational condi-
tions involved in radical interpretation.20 However, in the 
“basic cases” observation seems reduced to perceptual obser-
vation, and this raises the difficulty of how mere perception 
can play a role in detecting changes in the observable environ-
ment in cases which are non-perceptual (e.g., religion, math, 
logic, and perhaps ethics). But, if by “observational” we mean 
“naturalistic” in the sense of accessible to investigation by 
natural means, which includes the natural and social sciences, 
this might offer a way out. The public conditions in which, 
for example, religious language is used seemingly must in-
volve social or institutional elements. Interpretation of “God 
blesses this marriage” is seemingly impossible without some 
reflective appreciation of purely perceptual elements (e.g., 
the movements of the priest with re ect to the betrothed), 
but also such things as the social context of the ritual move-
ments, the attitudes of others involved, the semantic inter-
pretation of other bits of language (e.g., liturgy), etc. This is 
another a ect of “holism” – one area of language cannot be 
interpreted in isolation, but only as part of connections to 
others, which must be understood as filtered through (largely 
shared) canons of rationality and against a large background 
of (mostly true) shared beliefs. Traditional approaches to the 
study of religion/s, including textual hermeneutics, anthro-
pology, sociology, psychology, discourse analysis, etc., would 
have important roles to play.
Where does this leave CSR? The growing evidence 
seems to be that there are common cognitive psychological 
processes involved in the formulation and transmission of 
“religious” beliefs. These are amongst the “causes” of religious 
belief, but cannot be identified as the sole causes. In an anal-
ogous vein, the social contexts also provide causal factors in 
the formation and transmission of “religious” belief, but they 
cannot be identified as the sole causes either. Both might play 
important causal roles, and thus are semantically relevant 
within a Davidsonian approach.21 
In our view, this seems reasonable for all bits of language. 
The cause of my belief that the sun is shining is not just the 
shining of the sun (and that I am responsive to changes in the 
environment with re ect to the shining of the sun), but also 
that, for whatever reason, I emerged as a creature having the 
neurological/cognitive capacities to observe my environment 
(i.e., to formulate beliefs on the basis of observation). That 
you and I can both believe that the sun is shining – i.e., that we 
can share the same belief – presupposes both a commonality 
in our cognitive processing as well as a commonality in our 
access to and responsiveness to an “external” world. 
We conclude with optimism about the pro ects of 
these claims: (i) there are common cognitive neural/psycho-
logical processes which are explanatorily relevant in proposed 
meaning-theories for any discourse, and (ii) those processes 
need semantic supplementation with reference to “external” 
and “naturalistic” factors. Religious discourse, as much as any 
discourse, requires interpretation by “connecting c ognition 
and culture” (Lawson and McCauley, 1990).
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